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1. Introduction 
Non-compliance is one of the central challenges of fisheries management. Fishers are subject 
to numerous regulations that constrain their opportunities to earn income, and temptations 
and opportunities for offending repeatedly occur (Kuperan & Sutinen 1998). The use of 
fishing gears with incorrect mesh size, catching undersized fish, dynamite fishing and poison, 
destroying flora and fauna, and conducting fishing activities during closed seasons and in 
protected breeding grounds, challenge the sustainability of fisheries—not only because of the 
negative environmental effects, but also because non-compliance can have a domino effect 
(Arias et al. 2015). Non-compliance may result in unsustainable fishing and reduced stocks, 
threatening the very livelihood source on which fishers depend. Why then do fishers use 
fishing methods which in the long run deprive them of the source of their livelihoods? The 
scholarship on small-scale fisheries draws on two areas of theory to explain non-compliance, 
providing instrumental and normative explanations.   
The instrumental approach explains non-compliance using the rational choice framework, 
being “based on the assumption that the individual primarily responds to the immediate 
benefits of compliance or non-compliance behaviour” (Raakjær Nielsen 2003: 425). Based on 
the tradition of critical criminology, which in the 1970s developed a political economy 
approach to crime (Hauck 2008), it is assumed that fishers make decisions through cost-
benefit analysis and use illegal methods when potential benefits outweigh perceived costs. 
The normative approach on the other hand argues against the “under-socialized” conception 
of social action (Granovetter 1985), advocating an expansion of the utility-based rational 
choice model through incorporating a sub-set of potential factors from relevant disciplines 
(Al-Subhi et al. 2013). The instrumental approach has most often been associated with 
attempts to reduce non-compliance by increasing monitoring, control and surveillance in 
order to increase the potential of catching illegal fishers, whereas the normative approach has 
led to an alternative route, promoting regulation that will be supported by fishers (Raakjær 
Nielsen 2003). By stressing the need to take into account sources of motivation other than 
only external incentives, normative theorists therefore sought to offer a more nuanced 
approach to explaining fishers’ behaviour.  
Despite a burgeoning literature on normative explanations for compliance (Kuperan & 
Sutinen 1998; Gezelius 2004; Hauck & Kroese 2006; Hauck 2008; Eggert & Lokina 2010; 
Gezelius & Hauck 2011; Jagers et al. 2012; Al-Subhi et al. 2013; Arias et al. 2015; Boonstra 
et al. 2017), the contributing factors through which norms affect fishers’ behaviour remain 
insufficiently elaborated. Al-Subhi et al. (2013), for example, show why fishers follow the 
rules—to avoid sanctions, because of peer pressure, their personal morality—but evidence on 
why fishers break rules is lacking. Kuperan and Sutinen (1998: 312) refer to the “sense of 
moral obligation” and Raakjær Nielsen (2003: 427) talks of “fishers’ personal moral and 
perception of what is right and wrong”, but the exact mechanisms through which normative 
reasoning translates into non-compliance are not apparent. Paradoxically, by examining 
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compliance, literature does not at the same time necessarily explain non-compliance, as the 
latter is conceived simply as an outcome of “moral deficit”, rather than an action founded on 
alternative concepts of fairness.1 Although these studies in a broad sense link non-compliance 
to the issue of morality, they do not explain how fishers’ behaviour depends on following 
different modes of moral justification.  
In this paper, the modes of moral justification are studied inductively and through a 
pluralistic framework, drawing on theoretical advancements in the school of pragmatic 
sociology (Bénatouïl 1999; Wagner 1999; Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). The paper 
identifies four such modes of justification which act as drivers of illegalities: specific local-
ecological knowledge (the principle of superfluousness), general legitimacy of the state 
apparatus (the principle of autonomy), lack of social trust (the principle of futility) and 
poverty (the principle of necessity). The given typology derives from literature and is 
generated from data generated from fieldwork, with the interview schedule including probes 
on modes of justification identified in the literature. (Although not all patterns were equally 
represented among the respondents, and some were almost absent from findings, this was 
nonetheless included in the typology as earlier literature reported its importance.) The main 
contribution of this paper therefore consists in providing a systematic overview of moral 
resources used to ground the use of illegal practices, rooted in competing conceptions of 
common good. This is crucial for improving the cost effectiveness of fisheries enforcement, 
given that different modes of non-compliant behaviour require tailor-made solutions, rather 
than a one-size-fits-all approach. 
Fieldwork on which this paper draws was undertaken on Lake Victoria, East Africa. Lake 
Victoria, the second largest freshwater lake in the world, is a major fisheries resource and 
was chosen for the research as it exemplifies well the challenges of fisheries management. It 
is believed that a prevalence of illegalities threatens the sustainability of the fisheries (LVFO 
2015; 2016). Prior to the late 1990s, fisheries management on the lake was centralised, 
determined on a country-by-country basis, and included little or no community participation.  
A lake-wide harmonised co-management approach was introduced from the late 1990s, 
where resource users (including boat owners, crew and traders) at fish landing sites work 
with government to manage the fishery and contribute to policy development. This approach 
led to the formation of community-based Beach Management Units (BMUs) around the lake, 
with an elected committee and membership composed of everyone working within fisheries 
at a fish landing site. Despite the introduction of co-management, the extent of illegalities in 
the lake fisheries is not believed to have decreased (LVFO 2015; 2016).  
The next section describes the theoretical framework, followed by the methods and data used 
in the research, and the results, which are presented by describing four patterns that act as 
drivers of non-compliance. In the discussion section, the findings are situated within the 
context of the literature on fisheries compliance. Finally, the conclusion sets out the 
contribution of the paper to existing knowledge and identifies areas where further research 
could usefully be undertaken.  
 
1 This is not identical, but is related to the tendency to equate instrumental behaviour with non-compliance, and conversely, 
to associate normative perspectives to compliance. For instance: ‘The normative perspective emphasizes what individuals 
consider just and moral, instead of what is in their self-interest. Individuals tend to comply with the law to the extent that 
they perceive the law as appropriate and consistent with their internalized norms’ (e.g. Kuperan & Sutinen 1998: 312) and 
‘in situations with overcapacity the fishers can be expected to have an instrumental rationality and be driven by economic 
motives. This creates incentives for non-compliance’ (Raakjær Nielsen 2003: 427). However, these dichotomies are not 
overlapping: the dichotomy ‘instrumental vs normative’ denotes different conceptions of human agency, while the 
dichotomy ‘compliance vs non-compliance’ refers to the outcome of the agency. That is why ontological perspectives can 
lead both ways, instrumental reasoning to compliance, and normative to non-compliance.   
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2. Theoretical framework 
According to normative arguments, fishers who engage in illegal fishing do so because they 
follow internal incentives (their values, tradition, or local conventions that are in disaccord 
with fishing regulations), which undermines the legitimacy of the rules governing fishing 
activities.2 But what are the exact mechanisms through which normative reasoning translates 
into non-compliance? This issue is explored by analysing moral framing of non-compliant 
behaviour.  
Gezelius (2004) contributed significantly in this regard by tracing how morality of 
compliance is connected to perceived moral obligation to protect the common good. He 
pointed out that the moral principle of rule compliance can contradict the moral principle of 
survival, recognizing moral barriers which exist between various non-compliant practices 
which is associated with the purpose of fishing. Whereas illegal fishing for subsistence was 
directed at satisfying personal needs of the fishers, and therefore limited in scope, illegal 
commercial fishing poaching was condemned and socially sanctioned, as in the eyes of the 
fisherfolk it was seen as a threat to the common good. However, what if there are multiple 
conceptions of ‘common good’ within fishing communities? Survival of the fish stock in 
functionalist terms could be taken as an ultimate common good, given it is the precondition 
for the survival of the community at large (not only in terms of physical survival of its 
members, but survival in broader cultural and social meaning—mores, tradition, overall way 
of life), yet at the same time, it is important to bear in mind that collectivities are rarely 
constituted by a single social order.  
To take this into account, this paper embraced the theoretical framework developed by 
Boltanski and Thevenot (1999; 2006). Rather than overemphasizing the impact of the social 
on the individual, and sliding into the assumption that society is unified and built on 
consensual grounds, their conception of society is essentially broken into different, often 
antagonistic worlds. Boltanski and Thévenot (1999; 2006) developed a grammar of different 
modes of justification, which they called “orders of worth”. This typology consists of 
systematic and coherent principles which are mutually incompatible with, and irreducible to, 
each other (Wagner 1999: 343). Furthermore, the choice of the respective mode of 
justification is not attached to collectivities but to situations, which then oblige individuals to 
shift between different modes. In order to act in a normal way, an average person must be 
able to shift between situations which require different orders of worth (1999: 365). Thus, 
instead of being prisoners of Bourdieu’s habitus (Bourdieu 1977), Boltanski and Thévenot’s 
agents are capable of voluntarily switching between different modes of justification, 
dependent on respective circumstances.  
In the case of fisheries compliance, this is in line with the approach developed by Boonstra et 
al. (2017). In their typology of fishers’ responses to regulation, they warn that “in reality, 
people will embody a repertoire of posturing that they deploy based on a changing and 
complex social-ecological environment” (2017: 10), indicating that the different responses 
are often employed by same actors in different situations.   
To conclude, in order to provide a detailed explanation of how social norms affect fishers’ 
choice of illegal fishing methods, this paper explores how fishers justify non-compliance in 
2 Raakjær Nielsen argues that ‘in the instrumental approach, it is important that the regulations and the distribution of fishing 
rights are perceived as legitimate’ (2003: 427). However, if legitimacy indeed is a normative phenomenon, then it remains 
unclear how it can be combined with a view that people act only according to external incentives, which are by definition 
non-normative?  In this respect, non-compliance can be studied in the context of legitimacy only using the normative 
approach. 
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moral terms. However, rather than operating with a simplified, binary concept of morality 
(which can, but does not have to be attached to functionalist assumptions—the need to 
protect the common good), this paper is built on the theoretical framework which allows 
analysing how actions are founded on alternative concepts of fairness. This in turn provides a 
more differentiated, and at the same time more robust model of fishers’ attitudes towards 
regulation.   
 
3. Methodology  
The research was carried out between April and June 2015 at 18 landing sites, 6 in each 
country that borders the lake – Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The landing sites were chosen 
to reflect the diversity of Lake Victoria fisheries communities (geographical diversity, 
inclusion of both island and mainland landing sites, different size), and to have an active 
fishery of at least one major commercial species (Nile perch, tilapia and dagaa).  
At each landing site a sample of up to six fisheries’ stakeholders were interviewed in the local 
language. This included interviews with three groups of respondents, boat crew, boat owners, 
and fisheries traders and processors, the main occupational groups of Lake Victoria fisheries. 
36 boat crew, 36 boat owners, and 32 traders and processors were interviewed. The sampling 
approach was a mix of purposive sampling and convenience sampling within a stratified 
sampling approach for the occupation-based respondents. The interviewers identified 
respondents with the help of BMU leaders, which may have brought in an element of bias. 
However, the limited time in the field meant due to financial constraints meant that 
respondents were chosen based on availability, and by comparing data across landing sites 
and triangulating between interviews, the data has been analysed and interpreted with care. 
Furthermore, interviews were also conducted with 18 BMU leaders (each for landing site in 
which the fieldwork was carried out), and 12 fisheries officers (6 in Uganda, 4 in Kenya and 
2 in Tanzania).  
A semi-structured interview schedule was used, with some adjustments for the three 
occupational groups to address occupation-specific issues. The interviews lasted around an 
hour. After each interview, interviewers completed a form containing basic socio-
demographic data and interviewers’ observations, which on some occasions provided 
important contextual data. This was piloted and finalised before the fieldwork commenced. 
The interviews were recorded in the original language of the interview, and then transcribed 
and translated to English by the interviewers. Finally, the transcripts were coded and analysed 
in NVivo, a software specialized for qualitative analysis.  
The sample included 85 males and 19 female respondents, with the gender imbalance being a 
consequence of the occupation based sampling. The majority of boat crew and boat owners 
are men, while most women work as fish traders and processors (LVFO undated). The age of 
the respondents ranged from 19 to 66 years, with the respondents reporting on average 11 
years of experience working in their profession. Most of the respondents lived permanently at 
the landing site at which they were interviewed, with the exception of 15 respondents. Quotes 
used in this article were selected to include responses from different occupational groups and 
to represent various landing sites; the country and occupational group is given as the source 
of the quotation,3  with the number of the landing site, from 1 to 6 in each country.  
Since the interviews included potentially incriminating topics (e.g. illegal fishing practices) 
ethical principles and procedures were utilized to address possible ethical issues concerning 
3 Occupation and stakeholder codes: Bc for boat crew, Bo for boat owners, Ft for fish traders and processors, BMU for BMU 
leaders, and Fo for fisheries officers. Country codes: Ug for Uganda, Ke for Kenya, Tz for Tanzania.  
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the participation of individuals in the research process and the storage of data resulting from 
their participation. Firstly, the interview data were recorded under unique alphanumeric codes 
for each respondent; this rendered it impossible to link a respondent as an individual physical 
entity to the audio and textual data stored about them. Secondly, all respondents were asked 
to give informed verbal consent, after the interviewer had fully explained the nature, 
consequences and potential risks of the research, and once the interviewers were fully 
confident that the respondent had understood all the relevant information.  
 
4. Drivers of non-compliance 
4.1. Local-ecological knowledge: the principle of superfluousness 
The first driver of non-compliance considered relates to perceptions of fish stock condition 
and therefore whether regulations are seen as necessary. Perceptions of fish stock condition 
are related to “local ecological knowledge” (LEK), defined as an intricate knowledge which 
resource users possess of their local resource base (Crona and Bodin 2006; 2010). Crona and 
Bodin explored to what extent LEK varies across different groups of fishers operating in the 
coastal seascape. Both as a consequence of the specific conditions in which they worked, and 
due to the influence of peers—the analysis showed strong tendencies for within-group 
communications among most occupational groups—different occupational groups were prone 
to express different opinions on key ecological issues. This is exemplified by the deep-sea 
fishers, who target pelagic stocks that are less vulnerable to over-fishing on a local scale, 
believing that stocks are not overexploited, in contrast to the views of others more reliant on 
inshore fisheries. This belief contributed to a lack of willingness to support collective action 
to address depleting fish stocks. 
The relationship of LEK to compliance motivation lies in the convincing logic that local users 
are more likely to comply with regulations that aim to maintain fish stocks if the fisheries 
stakeholders believe the fish stock is endangered. But what if actors do not believe that fish 
stocks are depleted? In this case, it becomes morally justifiable to non-comply with the 
regulation as it is seen as superfluous. This was reported by several respondents on Lake 
Victoria who expressed doubts about the widely reported stock depletion, blaming the 
occasional shortages of fish on seasonal fluctuations: “Sometimes there is fish and sometimes 
there is no fish. There are varieties. It is seasonal, in one there is and in another it is less. I 
cannot say that there will be no fish in future. (…) The government should leave us alone and 
let us fish” (BoKe1).  And, another stated “now what can I say? When you tell them, they 
say, these things were thrown up by the government. When you say fish is depleting, they say 
no, how is fish depleting? So you find here traditionally, people believe that fish cannot 
deplete” (BMUUg1). A similar pattern was reported by Boonstra et al. (2017), according to 
whom the disbelief that the stock is being depleted was related to the general distrust in 
science: “Some fishers that we interviewed expressed their mistrust bluntly—‘No, I don’t 
trust research: I only trust what comes in my nets,’ while others take more time to point out 
what they see as problems with scientific measurement: ‘Yes, it [the fish] moves of course 
and we move too, but the researchers don’t. They don’t move, they have their sample 
stations’” (Boonstra et al. 2017: 9).  
However, the majority of respondents expressed their belief that fish stocks of the lake were 
seriously depleted: “Fishing is getting difficult. Fishing becomes more difficult as time goes 
by. I used to see fish playing here in the water. They are not seen nowadays. You need an 
engine now. You need a lot of money to buy bait and petrol. You go to fish in Uganda and 
pay fees to Uganda. Fishing is becoming more difficult” (BoKe1) and “the situation currently 
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is very bad. Before I heard our grandparents were using only 10 nets and come with many 
fish but nowadays you go fishing with 50 nets and it is hard to come with even 10 kg” 
(BcTz1). Furthermore, respondents associated this trend with illegal fishing practices. “In 
future our children will suffer because the catches and incomes from fisheries are reducing. 
The four years I have spent here I have noticed a sharp decline in fish catches. We used to 
bring like eight basins of Mukene per trip but nowadays we get like three basins if we have 
got a lot. That means our children will suffer.(…) What is causing the decline is that there are 
people who are engaging in illegal fishing. So fish will die off and fish stocks will decline” 
(BcUG1).  
Overall, it was found that fishers expressed concern about the state of fish stocks and 
accepted the need for regulations. There was then little evidence that non-compliance is 
motivated by a belief that fish stocks are in a good condition and should be exploited or that 
regulations are superfluous.  
 
4.2. Challenging state legitimacy: the principle of autonomy 
Legitimacy has been defined as a reservoir of loyalty on which leaders can draw, giving them 
the discretionary authority of loyalty they require to govern effectively (Raakjær Nielsen 
2003). In the case of fisheries this largely refers to the acceptance by fishers of rules and 
regulations, and the legitimacy of the state to interfere in fishing. In our four-part typology, 
the aim of fishers to be autonomous, and therefore not subject to regulation, reflects the 
principle of autonomy.  
The literature on Lake Victoria fisheries has suggested that in the eyes of local users, open 
access to the fisheries is sometimes seen as a God given entitlement (Jentoft et al. 2010). 
According to this view, the state has no right to tell fishers when and where to fish, or which 
fishing methods to use. Non-compliance is therefore morally justified by the autonomy of 
fishers from the state. This has been reported in the fisheries literature which highlighted 
“how a strong emphasis on values of ‘independence’ and ‘autonomy’ in fishers’ occupational 
identity lead many fishers to naturally resent interference of authorities” (Boonstra et al., 
2017: 11). When it comes to the findings of our research, however, the legitimacy of the state 
to interfere was almost completely unchallenged. According to most respondents, the need 
for government actions in regulating fishing on the lake was unquestionable: “Yeah! The 
government should get involved in fishing matters. They know what is good and what is bad 
for us and they have the right to tell us what to do” (BoKe2). Rather than questioning the 
right of governments to implement fishing regulation, the respondents called for action from 
the government: “Fishers are very environmentally destructive, therefore it is important for 
government to guide us for the sustainability of our fisheries resource” (BcTz2). Without 
government, “the fisheries would have in fact already collapsed” (BcTz3).  
In the literature it has been reported that fisherfolk have historically had a stigmatized 
occupational identity, developing the feeling they are under attack by the media and policy 
makers (Urquhart et al. 2011: 244). However, our respondents accepted the state as their ally, 
rather than as an external actor from whom they need to defend their autonomy and 
independence. For the respondents, illegalities were strongly related to the issue of state 
legitimacy, but in the opposite sense, as the governments were criticized for doing too little in 
curbing illegalities. Inadequate fisheries management, including enforcement, was attributed 
to insufficient funding for monitoring, control and surveillance, corrupt officials allowing the 
continuation of illegal practices, the production and import of illegal gears and inadequate 
political support in fighting illegalities. Allowing the import of illegal gears, and forbidding 
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the fishers to use these gears, left one respondent from Uganda puzzled: “surely you cannot 
import something that you know will affect your country negatively. [Perhaps] government 
wants to tempt us the way Adam and Eve were tempted?” (laughs) (FtUg1). A boat crew 
suggested that “the way government ensures that bombs don’t get into this country should be 
the way government should ensure that illegal gears don’t get into the country or are not 
manufactured in this country” (BcUg2). Whereas Etiegni et al. (2011) ascribe a high degree 
of illegalities on the Lake Victoria to the low respect for government authority among the 
fishers, our data question the direction of that causal relationship and indicate that low respect 
for government authority may in fact be the result of governments’ failure to address 
prevalent illegalities.  
Finally, even though our research has not confirmed that non-compliance can be explained by 
the lack of legitimacy of the government to interfere, the failure of the states to prevent the 
import of illegal gears has led to an alternative legitimacy problem. Why comply with state 
regulations if illegal gears can be legally bought? “People still fish illegally because you can 
find someone with a monofilament net and you ask that person ‘why are you using this net?’ 
And the person tells you that I am not the one who manufactures these nets and I am not the 
one who imports them into the country and besides we pay taxes for them and they are sold in 
shops, what do you want me to do?” (BoUg3). If anything, the role of the state, in the eyes of 
the respondents, should be even greater than it already is: “It is true fishing in the lake is God 
given but people misuse it therefore government should come in order to regulate.  (…) 
Government has not done its work fully e.g. the use of beach seine and less mesh size has 
persisted. I think government has just surrendered the lake to fishers to destroy it. So 
government should add in more effort because it can order within a week and all the illegal 
fishing will be stopped” (BcUg4). This alternative legitimacy problem partly overlaps with 
the next principle which fishers use to justify non-compliance: the principle of futility.  
 
4.3. Lack of social trust: the principle of futility 
The alleged lack of compliance of other actors provides a special form of moral justification 
for the wrong-doers. According to the principle of futility, the legitimacy of fishing 
regulations is not diminished because of its source (as in the principle of autonomy), but 
because of the prevailing fishing practices of other resource users. This concerns the fishers’ 
disbelief that, even if they would cease using illegal methods, others would carry on with 
illegal fishing, and reflects the problem of lack of trust within natural resource management 
(Grafton 2005; Sekhar 2006; Stern & Coleman 2015). In the words of one respondent: “The 
bad gears are not good but if you see people use bad gears you also need food. I will use bad 
gears because everyone else is using a bad gear. In that case everyone will use bad gears” 
(BoKe3).  
The existence of illegalities was widely acknowledged among the respondents, and the 
implications of knowledge of this for non-compliance resonated in their words: “When you 
tell fishers at this landing to comply with the rules and regulations, they ask you whether 
other BMUs are doing the same” (FtUg3). Asked if he would report someone using illegal 
fishing, a boat crew respondent from Uganda, said: “I would but you see this lake is big and 
almost all the landing sites have illegal fishers but they don’t report them. I would only report 
if such kind of reporting is being done on every landing site on Lake Victoria” (BcUg3). The 
hypothesis that the free rider problem can affect the persistence of illegal fishing by 
diminishing the legitimacy of the fishing regulation was supported by the data, as a number 
of respondents justified the use of illegal methods with the illegal behaviour of other fishers 
on the lake. However, in our interviews, we encountered two tendencies which mitigated the 
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free rider problem for the perpetuation of illegalities, and which therefore made the “tragedy 
of the commons” (Hardin 1968) a less likely outcome.  
Firstly, a number of them perceived the volume of illegalities as decreasing: “Illegal fishing 
was open those days, even you [the interviewer] the time you have been here since morning 
you would have seen illegal gears”. However, “these days, you can even spend a whole 
month without seeing someone with illegal gears!” (BcUg1). The positive development was 
primarily associated with the work of BMUs and police enforcement: “In the past it was 
normal to see the beach seines around the lake, but nowadays illegal gears have decreased. It 
is good for police to be involved in patrol with fisheries officers because it improves safety in 
the Lake Victoria” (BcTz2). If the illegalities, in the view of the respondents, persisted, it was 
often only in the smaller and more distant landing sites, where the enforcement was not 
frequent.  
The second finding concerned the perception of illegalities elsewhere on the lake. Even 
though some respondents seemed inclined to put the attribute illegal fishing to fishers from 
other districts or countries, most respondents had the opposite perception, holding that 
illegalities elsewhere were better enforced than in their own districts and countries.  “The 
people who come from elsewhere do good fishing. The people here are the ones doing the 
bad gears” (BoKe4). Because illegalities are less tolerated elsewhere, “when some fishers go 
to those landing sites they come back regretting how they can’t manage fishing because those 
landings do not consider illegal fishing practices” (BoUg1). A similar pattern occurred when 
the respondents were asked about illegalities in other countries: only a few respondents put 
the blame for fish depletion on the use of illegal gears in other countries, while most assessed 
the level of illegalities in their own countries to be much higher.  
Overall, the principle of futility was evident in the fisheries, demonstrated through 
perceptions of widespread illegalities, making it seem unworthwhile to invest in fishing 
through legal means. 
 
4.4. Poverty: the principle of necessity 
The final form of justification refers to the disadvantageous socio-economic status of fishers 
and the risks they face in providing for their livelihoods, which then dictated the choice of 
fishing methods. Since the use of illegal methods is considered a necessity rather than a 
choice, non-compliance becomes morally justifiable: “They [illegal fishers] fish illegally or 
use bad gears not because they like but it is poverty that makes people use bad gears. If they 
can be boosted, they would not be doing bad fishing gears” (BoKe2); “I have never been 
arrested but my friends have been arrested before. And normally, they are arrested even when 
they know that what they are doing is wrong. But because they need to survive and also due 
to weak laws they are able to practice illegal fishing” (BcUg3); “We were told that we should 
use 10 mm, but 10mm cannot catch omena [dagaa]. So we use the wrong gears because they 
are the ones that can catch the fish that we want. There are also some gears that catch the 
young Nile perch but because we must eat, we use those gears because we have no means” 
(BoKe1). 
The negative effect of low financial status on the use of legal methods is reflected in three 
main ways: the illegal fishing gear with smaller mesh size allowed larger catches of fish than 
the fishing gear of the recommended mesh and hook size, at least in the eyes of the fishers; 
the high cost of legal fishing gear in comparison to nets used illegally (often this included 
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mosquito nets distributed free of charge to Lake Victoria residents);4 and finally, the problem 
of frequent gear theft which put the respondents who had originally purchased legal gear at 
risk of losing it.5 As many fishers see themselves as burdened with uncertainty, the principle 
of necessity sometimes overlaps with the principle of futility: “The bad gears are not good. 
But if you see people use bad gears you also need food. I will use bad gears because everyone 
else is using a bad gear. In that case everyone will use bad gears” (BoKe3). Thus, not only 
are the fishers forced to use illegal methods due to their poverty, but as many of them are in a 
similar position, it is assumed that the fisheries will eventually be depleted, which gives them 
moral justification to continue with illegal harvesting.  
The importance of poverty also underlines the exposure to illegal fishing of marginal and 
vulnerable groups: “women are the most involved in illegal fishing. Because they do not have 
enough capital that would make one own a boat as result they resort to illegal fishing as their 
start up job” (BoUg4). This has repercussions on the level of participation of women in their 
BMUs as they “fear to speak up” in order to avoid accusations for breaking the law. The 
inferior position of the poorer populations within landing sites at the same time leave them 
vulnerable to exploitation on behalf of the fish agents and boat owners.  
The necessity of using illegal methods is closely related to the short-term perspective which 
the fishers felt they were forced to accept: “People use illegal gears such as undersize gillnets, 
beach seines and monofilaments just to get income and food for survival and they are just 
concerned with their present situation without considering the future” (BcTz4). Since their 
actions are framed as a desperate means of survival—as they do what they can to sustain 
themselves today, delaying worries about what comes tomorrow—the results indicate that 
fishers are not disinterested in the future of fisheries. Numerous respondents expressed strong 
identity related to their occupation, satisfaction with their job, and have a strong desire to 
continue working as fishers. This confirmed the importance of “fishing as a way of life” 
(Trimble & Johnson 2013), providing additional evidence against the assumption that fishing 
is an employment of last resort.  
The idea that people are destroying the resources for tomorrow because of the lack of long-
term perspective in the lake fisheries is well reported in the literature. Etiegni et al. (2011) 
talk of the market logic which dictated a strategy of stock exploitation to the point of 
economic extinction, to gain a short-term high return which can be reinvested elsewhere. 
Barratt et al. (2014) established that there are various long-term strategies that people adopt if 
they are reluctant to continue working as fishers: investing in assets away from the landing 
4 The estimates varied, but illegal gear were always perceived as less expensive: 100,000-300,000 UGH (25$-80$) in 
comparison to 2-4 million UGH (550$-1,100$) for recommended nets in Uganda; or 300,000-600,000 TZS (130$-270$) in 
comparison for 8 million TZS (3,580$) for a complete set of legal gears in Tanzania. Whereas buying the right fishing gears 
would require one to get a bank loan, according to one respondent, one could buy monofilament nets just by selling one goat. 
Furthermore, the choice of illegal gears was closely related to the costs of additional equipment. Legal fishing gears 
necessitate a lot of space, which is why those who fish using legal gears use distant fishing grounds with the help of motor 
engines. However, most fishers use paddles, which limits them to fishing grounds that are near the mainland. Finally, besides 
specific types of propulsion, the use of illegal gear often comes with smaller boat size: “To make the boat is also expensive 
so some people use small gears and cheap boats to fish in breeding areas because they need food and to live” (BcKe3). As a 
result, illegal fishers often operate inshore where recommended gears do not work.  
5 Even if the fishers had the right gear, several respondents mentioned the problem of keeping the recommended gear, due to 
being targeted by thieves. “If you try to use good gears and put it in the waters, it will soon be stolen. The people here are 
using illegalities. This is the type of fishery we have here. There is nothing we can do about it” (BcKe2). This was confirmed 
by numerous respondents: “The problem is theft on the lake. One struggles and buys a legal gear and then the thieves come 
and steal it. Moreover, one could have got a loan to buy the legal gears so one remains suffering paying the loan even when 
the gears for which he used the money have been stolen” (BcUg5). Unlike authorised gears, safeguarding an illegal gear is 
very easy: “These other authorised nets can be stolen. The engines are stolen, but if you have your illegal gear like a boat 
seine, it is very portable. It does not weigh more than 30 kilos, so after fishing you just carry it to your house. In the lake you 
are with it, so it is safe” (FoUg). 
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sites and investing in the education of their children, as a mechanism of inter-generational 
upward mobility. However, these explanations are grounded in the instrumental logic: the 
fishers who extract maximum quantities of fish in the short term are presented as typical 
economic rational-choice agents who are led by interests rather than norms. Yet the goal of 
the normative approach taken in this paper is to observe how these conditions provide moral 
justification for non-compliance, acting as a mechanism which undermines the legitimacy of 
the fishing regulation. In other words, even behaviour traditionally assigned to the economic 
models was formulated in moral terms.  
 
5. Discussion 
Understanding of motivations for non-compliance is central to improving the effectiveness of 
regulations and enforcement (Kuperan & Sutinen 1998). Four modes of justification were 
identified from literature on fisheries compliance and from the fieldwork data, based on: 
superfluousness of the fisheries regulation due to differences in local-ecological knowledge; 
feelings of autonomy from the state due to the lack of state legitimacy; alleged futility of 
attempts to prevent illegalities due to the free rider problem; and, necessity caused by 
poverty. Table 1 summarizes the nature of, and literature supporting, the four modes of 
justification.  
   
Table 1 Summary of modes of justification of fishers’ non-compliance 
Principle Justification Common good References 
Superfluousness Abundance of fish makes 
regulations superfluous 
Knowledge Crona and Bodin (2006; 2010), 
Boonstra et al. (2017) 
Autonomy Fishing as a natural entitlement—
the state has no right to interfere 
Freedom Jentoft et al. (2010), Urquhart et 
al. (2011), Boonstra et al. (2017) 
Futility Attempts to prevent depletion are 
futile—free rider problem 
Trust (or the lack 
thereof) 
Grafton (2005); Sekhar (2006), 
Stern & Coleman (2015) 
Necessity Right to survive—short-term 
perspective 
Survival Arias et al. (2015) 
 
Each mode of justification relies on a specific notion of common good which provides moral 
legitimation for the non-compliant behaviour: privileged access to knowledge, which allows 
the non-compliant fisher to assess whether the ban of certain fishing methods is needed; sense 
of freedom from the state to make decisions autonomously from the required regulation; the 
lack of trust in fellow fishers to cease illegal practices; and, the short-term notion of 
surviving, based on the general anthropocentric value of human life as a supreme good.  
The modes of justification are not entirely separate or mutually exclusive. Linkages between 
different modes are evident in the nature of the justification and in the way people articulate 
reasons for non-compliance. For example, a fisher may believe that government has the right 
to set and enforce regulations, yet believe that certain regulations are ‘superfluous’ or 
inappropriate. This suggests that whilst government may have legitimacy in the eyes of 
fisherfolk in fisheries management, certain regulations may lack legitimacy and undermine 
compliance. As a further example, fishers may accept government authority but believe it is 
futile to fish legally given the lack of enforcement or the superfluousness of certain 
regulations. However, despite interconnections between different principles, each of them can 
provide a coherent justification for non-compliant behaviour.  
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The results show that the fishers from Lake Victoria in general do not try to deny the trend of 
fish depletion, and acknowledge the right of the state to interfere in fishing practices. There is 
little evidence that fisheries regulations are seen as superfluous as the majority of respondents 
reported belief that there has been a decline in fish stocks and catch and that this should be 
addressed through greater action, including through enforcement, by governments. The 
authority of government to develop and enforce regulations was not questioned despite 
concern raised about the performance of government in this regard. This lack of enforcement 
and wider effective fisheries management contributed to non-compliance being justified by 
the principle of futility; why comply when there is so much illegality? The data suggested 
that the use of illegalities is motivated to a larger extent by the alleged non-compliance of the 
other fishers—although in the perception of the respondents, the scope of illegalities seemed 
to be decreasing, and mostly concerned their home region. Finally, the principle of necessity 
led people to argue that they have no choice, given the state of the fisheries but to fish 
illegally. This finding is in line with Gezelius (2004) who found that illegalities may be 
socially accepted if the fish is for household consumption rather than for commercial gain, 
though in the case of Lake Victoria, poverty as a justification for illegalities provides a 
justification for the capture and sale of fish to secure livelihoods, which may include paying 
rent, buying food and paying school fees. 
Even though the importance of poverty for non-compliance was related to the fishers’ short 
term logic, as several authors have suggested (Etiegni et al. 2011; Barratt et al. 2014), in this 
paper the lack of long term perspective was seen as part of the normative mechanism, rather 
than instrumental logic. In the works by Etiegni et al. (2011) and Barratt et al. (2014), fishers’ 
short term perspectives have led to assumed rational choice decision-making, based on the 
calculation of potential gains and risks, with fishers ready to draw high short term returns in 
order to invest these in other areas. In this analysis, however, a short-term approach to fishery 
sustainability (the problem of overharvesting) is explained as part of the moral argument. 
Hence, non-compliance does not represent an investment strategy of rational choice actors, 
but rather a behaviour grounded on essentially moral justifications.  
The typology developed in this paper bears some similarity to the typology of motivational 
sources in fisheries compliance, presented in a recent piece of scholarship by Boonstra et al. 
(2017). They identify different types of responses towards regulation and authorities in the 
case study of Swedish Baltic fisheries. Four possible behavioural responses are listed in their 
framework: commitment (endorsement of regulation), resistance (dismissal of fishing 
authority), creativity (rule elusiveness), and reluctance (disengagement). Both papers go 
beyond binary interpretation of fishers’ behaviour (following rules vs not following rules), 
allowing cross-fertilization of concepts and ideas from different fields of research (sociology, 
anthropology, philosophy, cognitive science), on the one hand, and the study of natural 
resource management on the other. However, despite partial overlap between the two 
typologies, the framework developed in this paper is different in two ways. Firstly, Boonstra 
et al. offer a general typology of fishers’ behaviour, whereas the typology presented in this 
paper is focused specifically on non-compliance. Secondly, whereas morality plays an 
important role in outlining fishers’ responses in Boonstra et al., the typology developed in 
this paper addresses distinctive moral mechanisms rooted in competing conceptions of 
common good.  
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6. Conclusion 
This article sought to identify and explore moral justifications for non-compliance with 
fisheries regulations, drawing on literature and research data. It contributes to the literature on 
normative explanations for non-compliance, in which it is increasingly recognized that a 
variety of non-monetary incentives, such as legitimacy of regulations and authority and 
morals and norms, as experienced through group behaviour and social pressure, impact on 
fishers’ behaviour (Raakjær Nielsen 2003). Moral justifications reflect people’s experiences 
and perceptions of fisheries management and practices, as well as wider livelihood options 
and choices and the perceptions of enforcement and governance within wider society. In the 
tradition of economic sociology, the paper thereby demonstrates that fishing activity is 
embedded in broader social and cultural structures of beliefs and values. Even though this is 
not the first time that fishers’ non-compliant behaviour is linked to the sphere of morality, it 
is first, to the best of our knowledge, to provide a systematic overview of moral resources 
used to ground the use of illegal practices in alternative visions of fairness.  
The typology of moral justifications was found to facilitate a more nuanced analysis of 
reasons given for non-compliance and application of the typology brought out the 
interconnections between them. Recognition of linkages between the justifications, as well as 
the justifications themselves, have implications for measures taken to curb illegalities on 
Lake Victoria and elsewhere, as different motivations behind compliance behaviour require 
different regulatory strategies to promote compliance (Boonstra et al. 2017). The results 
indicate that fisheries stakeholders from the lake are in general inclined to support measures 
which would stop overharvesting. Fishers do not reject the role of the state in solving 
problems, nor do they deny the problems exist; according to our data, they understand the 
problems related to illegalities and want to cooperate with other stakeholders in solving these 
problems. Even though measures such as closed seasons or protecting breeding grounds 
would limit their activities and endanger their incomes from fishing, a significant number of 
the respondents supported these measures, as long as they improve the fisheries. However, it 
is important that there is assistance available to fishers so that they can help themselves. The 
availability of micro-credit to access legal fishing gear, as well as more prevention of gear 
theft, in this respect seems to be crucial for further addressing non-compliance on the lake.  
It should be noted that the analysis presented in this paper has a number of limitations. 
Although the use of qualitative methods enabled collation of in-depth perspectives on the 
metrics of worth used by the respondents who justified the use of illegal methods, the small N 
sample made it impossible to conclude if the results are generalizable to the broader 
population. The results of the research could be therefore tested using quantitative methods. 
Secondly, the research based on in-depth interviews is better equipped for examining 
morality in its discursive, rather than behavioural aspect. Ethnographic research of competing 
moralities based on long-term participant observation would, on the other hand, be more 
fitting to studying what happens when these justifications are translated to social acts, and 
how moralities work in practice. The final limitation pertains to the cultural embeddedness of 
the moral categories. Can it be expected that fishers in Sweden or Chile use the same cultural 
repertoire of justifications as fishers in East Africa? The typology should be tested cross-
culturally, in small-scale fisheries contexts and co-management systems significantly 
different from the setting of Lake Victoria.  
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